

Air Force Life Cycle Management Center

Standard Process

For

*Cybersecurity*

*Assessment and Authorization*

Process Owner: AFLCMC/EZA

Date: 17 October 2024

Version: 3.5

***Cybersecurity Assessment and Authorization***

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Record of Changes** | | |
| Version | **Effective Date** | Summary |
| 1.0 | **1 Aug 13** | Standard process approved at18 Jul 13 S&P Board |
| 2.0 | **15 June 2017** | Updated to align with DoDI 8500.01 and DoDI 8510.01 (Cybersecurity and Risk Management Framework) and to expand the scope of applicability from PIT systems to the entire IT spectrum. Approved at the 15 June 2017 Standards & Process Board. |
| 3.0 | **21 June 2018** | Updated hyperlinks, references, and definitions. Improved various wording and clarified business rules in Table 2.0. Corrected administrative errors. Approved at the 21 June 2018 S&P Board. |
| 3.1 | **17 October 2019** | Annual Review. Aligned with SP for Program Protection Planning and System Security Engineering. Corrected administrative errors. Updated references. Approved at the 17 October 2019 S&P Board. |
| 3.2 | **15 October 2020** | Annual Review. Updated to reflect NIST 800-37 R2. Changed applicability to include SAP. Added ISSM. Corrected administrative errors. |
| 3.3 | **21 October 2021** | Annual Review. Updated references to current versions. Corrected administrative errors. Inputs, process, and customer modified within SIPOC Table 1. Added acquisition intelligence (AIA) roles and responsibilities, e.g. 3.0. Added adversary and threat descriptive information in paragraph 4.1.1. Approved at 21 Oct 2021 SP&P Group. |
| 3.4 | **20 October 2022** | Annual Review. Updated references. Corrected administrative errors. Articulated PM roles and responsibilities, Expanded upon SIPOC and WBS entries. Updated format of metric table. Approved at 20 Oct 22 SP&P Group. |
| 3.5 | **17 October 2024** | Annual Review. Corrected administrative errors. Assigned Process Ownership to EZA. Updated SMART Metric format. Expanded upon WBS entries. |

***Cybersecurity Assessment and Authorization***

**1.0 Description.**

This process defines Cybersecurity Assessment and Authorization (A&A) procedures for Information Systems (IS), Platform Information Technology (PIT), Information Technology (IT) Services, and IT products that are or will be assessed or assessed and authorized by Authorizing Officials (AOs) within the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) (e.g. Aircraft, Command and Control (C2), Rapid Cyber Acquisition (RCA), and Weapons boundaries, etc.). This process includes Special Access Programs (SAP) and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Programs within the above listed boundaries. See the Department of Defense (DoD) Risk Management Framework (RMF) Knowledge Service Collaboration Air Force Component Workspace site for the boundary definitions for each AO:

<https://rmfks.osd.mil/rmf/collaboration/Component%20Workspaces/AirForce/Pages/default.aspx>

This process addresses the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 8510.01, *Risk Management Framework for DoD Information Technology*, requirement of operating only authorized systems.

**2.0 Purpose.**

This process applies a risk-based methodology to assess and authorize systems and products acquired and managed by AFLCMC that fall within the authorization boundaries of AOs within AFLCMC in alignment with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 17-101, RMF for Department of the Air Force IT. The purpose is to identify and mitigate cybersecurity risks to protect systems and products from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction. This process details the “assess and authorize” RMF steps 4 and 5 as shown in Figure 1. For applicable AFLCMC systems, this process supports the implementation of cybersecurity currently prescribed by the Federal Information Systems Management Act (FISMA), as well as Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 8510.01, RMF for DoD IT; DoDI 8500.01, Cybersecurity; and DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework. This process does not supersede guidance published at the Department of the Air Force (DAF) level or for procedures specific to mission areas, but rather it defines a common assessment and authorization process used by AFLCMC. For Weapon Systems categorized as PIT, refer to AFLCMC Standard Process for Weapon System Program Protection Planning (PPP) & System Security Engineering (SSE) to help execute RMF steps 0-3 and step 6. Weapon System PPP & SSE assists in developing Request for Proposals and developing required A&A artifacts while executing the acquisition lifecycle.




Figure 1 – Risk Management Framework with A&A process steps circled

**3.0 Entry/Exit Criteria.**

3.1 Entry Criteria: Steps 0 to 3 (Prepare, Categorize, Select, and Implement) of the RMF process must be completed and the resulting artifacts, identified in Attachment 1 Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) 0-3, must be available before executing this assessment and authorization process. Senior AOs, Subordinate AOs (SAOs), AO Designated Representatives (AODRs), Security Control Assessors (SCAs) or SCA Representatives (SCARs), Acquisition Intelligence Analyst (AIA), and Program Managers (PMs) including their Engineers, Information System Security Managers (ISSMs) or Information Systems Security Officers (ISSOs) all have a role in completing the RMF steps 0-3 that are detailed in other DoD and DAF guidance, such as PM guides, systems security engineering directions/instructions etc. Any systems and products discussed in paragraph 1.0 which require a cybersecurity authorization must execute this process. Conditions that will initiate execution of this process include requirements for Authorization to Operate (ATO) or Interim Authorization to Test (IATT), modifications to an authorized system which impact the system’s cybersecurity risk posture, expiration of existing authorizations, or Denial of an Authorization to Operate (DATO).

3.2 Exit Criteria: Once an authorization has been issued, this assessment and authorization process is complete and is followed by step six, Monitor of the RMF process. All authorizations include a defined expiration date. On-going assessments of control effectiveness is required in accordance with the continuous monitoring plan for the authorization to remain valid.

**4.0 Process Workflow and Activities.**

4.1 The Suppliers, Inputs, Processes, Outputs, and Customers (SIPOC) for this standard process are shown in Table 1.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Suppliers | Inputs | Process | Outputs | Customer |
| Program Management Office (PMO) | PMO provides artifacts to start the process. Artifacts include architecture analysis, cyber requirements for security, resiliency, and survivability, allocation of those requirements to appropriate subsystems and components, designation of security controls to meet the cyber requirements, security plans, security assessment strategy/plans, risk assessment documents, and other related artifacts (e.g., Intel threat Reporting). | Cybersecurity risks are assessed and presented to the AO for acceptance, approval of POA&M, and operating conditions. | Cybersecurity authorization decision memoranda are issued by the AO then distributed to PMs and ISSMs of systems or products. | AO, PMO and MAJCOM user/sponsor. |

Table 1 - SIPOC


4.2 The A&A Process Flow is shown in Figure 2. Note boxes on a line between two organizations imply shared responsibility. Refer to the WBS, Attachment 1.

Figure 2 – A&A Process Flow

4.3 The WBS shown in Attachment 1, defines activities, descriptions, OPRs, Inputs/Outputs, Supplier and Customers.

4.4 Cybersecurity Risk Assessment and Management, Attachment 2, provides the preferred methodology for risk assessment and management.

**5.0** **Measurement.** Table 2 provides details on this standard process metric. SCAs will collect data, perform calculations, and report the metrics for their respective portfolios. Measurement is a mandatory element for all AFLCMC Standard Processes. It serves as a benchmark to gauge the effectiveness of Standard Processes.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Metric Attribute** | **Description** |
| **Administrative Info** | **Process Name** | Cybersecurity Assessment and Authorization |
| **Process Lead** | EZA |
| **Metric POC** | EZA |
| **Date Completed** | Weekly |
| **S** | **Metric Name / Description** | Cybersecurity Assessment and Authorization Process Utilization /  Determine the level of process usage across the center. |
| **Calculation** | Calculation is the number of systems executing the process divided by the total number of known systems that should be executing the process. |
| **Business Rules** | The number of systems executing the process are those systems that have completed “WBS 4.1.1, Submit Architecture Analysis Artifacts” including an ITCSC and those that have an existing authorization.  The total number of known systems that should be executing the process are those that have existing authorization or ITCSC (as counted above) and those that require an authorization that don’t currently have one. |
|  |  |  |
| **M** | **Data Source** | AFLCMC AO Tracking Databases |
| **A** | **Process Owner** | EZA |
| **Decision Maker** | AFLCMC/EN-EZ |
| **Review Forum / Governance Body** | Standards & Process (S&P) Group |
| **Target** | Green (80% in Process) |
| **Thresholds (R/Y/G)** | > 80% in Process (Green)  60%-80% in Process (Yellow)  <60% in Process (Red) |
| **Baseline Performance** | Will be established Semi-Annually (FY) |
| **R** | **Enterprise Impact / Process Purpose** | Defines Cybersecurity A&A procedures for systems and products. These systems and products are those that will be assessed or assessed and authorized by AOs appointed within the AFLCMC. |
| **T** | **Baseline Date** | Annually (FY) |
| **Review Frequency** | Semi-Annually (FY) |
| **Update Frequency** | Semi-Annually (FY) |

Table 2 – A&A Process Metric

**6.0**  **Roles and Responsibilities.** See DoDI 8500.01, DoDI 8510.01, and AFI 17-101 for detailed descriptions ofcybersecurityand RMFkey personnel roles and responsibilities. The paragraphs below provide top-level roles and responsibilities for key personnel involved in the AFLCMC A&A process.

6.1 Process Owner - AFLCMC/EZA:

6.1.1. Maintains and coordinates any changes to this process internally and externally to AFLCMC.

6.1.2. Leads and/or assigns personnel to work on any process improvement.

6.1.3. Coordinates changes to this process with the AFLCMC Standards & Process (S&P) Group.

6.2 AFLCMC S&P Group

6.2.1. Reviews and approves new critical and key processes.

6.2.2. Reviews and approves changes to critical and key processes.

6.3 Senior AO/Subordinate AO

6.3.1 Appointed by DAF Chief Information Officer (CIO).

6.3.2. Issues authorizations of systems based on overall risk level, except for systems with unmitigated “Very High” and “High” risk.

6.3.3. If risk is determined to be unacceptable, then the Senior AO, in collaboration with all system stakeholders e.g., DAF CIO, Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), Information System Owner (ISO), Major Command (MAJCOM), PMs, will issue the authorization decision in the form of a DATO.

6.4. AODR

6.4.1. Appointed by an AO.

6.4.2. Performs all duties designated by the AO except for risk acceptance.

6.5. SCA

6.5.1. Appointed by DAF CISO.

6.5.2. Makes risk recommendation to AO based on risk assessment.

6.5.3. AFLCMC/EZAS is the SCA for Aircraft.

6.5.4. AFLCMC/EBRS is the SCA for Weapons.

6.5.5. AFLCMC/EZC is the SCA for C2 and RCA.

6.6. SCAR

6.6.1. Appointed by an SCA.

6.6.2. Works with the PM, ISSM, ISSO, and RMF team to assess security controls for the security controls assessor. Responsible for advising and assisting the Program Management Office to develop the RMF package to achieve authorization. Reports to the SCA the level of risk associated with a system coming for authorization (IATT/ATO).

6.6.3. Validates assessment results.

6.7. PM

6.7.1. Responsible for system cybersecurity and for attaining authorizations. Ensures the system has a current authorization.

6.7.2. Develops cybersecurity documents in accordance with Attachment 1.

6.7.3. Ensures risk assessment results and associated mitigations are coordinated across appropriate levels of the program and with the program’s stakeholders (e.g. MAJCOM, System Owners, etc.).

6.7.4. Ensures assigned personnel are DoDI-8140 qualified; appointed in writing for the ISSM, ISSO, and Information System Security Engineering (ISSE) functions as required.

6.7.5. Responsible for addressing how cybersecurity will evolve as technology and threats advance through a program’s lifecycle.

6.7.6. Responsible for mitigating cyber vulnerabilities to protect operational effectiveness of the system (i.e., system functions, mission execution, system performance, and system resilience) and system program information that adversaries might use to develop attacks against the system functions.

6.7.7. Responsible for reinforcing cybersecurity against known and anticipated threats—identified during the preliminary stages of development and potential future vulnerabilities—identified through threat monitoring and mitigated by designing systems to rapidly address cyber risks by using modular open systems architectures.

6.7.8. Responsible for deploying cybersecurity risk analyses and controls mapping early in the system development to prevent loss of programmatic and operational hardware, software, and data throughout the remainder of the lifecycle.

6.7.9. Responsible for using cyber threat information produced by the Intelligence Community (IC) in development of their cybersecurity strategy and assessment of risk. IC Products include threat modules, Threat Reference Elements, & technology risk assessments.

6.7.10. Responsible for reviewing threat assessment by intelligence community 12 months before Authorization Termination Date. Authorizations must be updated at least every 3 years.

6.7.11. Responsible for maintaining awareness of threat actor activities that could impact the platform, enterprise, or mission by dedicating resources and personnel to continually assess and mitigate a program’s cyber risk.

6.7.12. Responsible for ensuring that cybersecurity requirements are considered in all aspects of their program to include operational cybersecurity and supply chain risk management.

6.7.13. Responsible to register/maintain program in Enterprise Mission Assurance Support Service or other respective databases as needed.

6.8. ISSM

6.8.1. Serves as the primary cybersecurity technical advisor to the AO, PM, and ISO.

6.8.2. Ensures the integration of cybersecurity into and throughout the lifecycle of the IT on behalf of the AO.

6.8.3. Ensures all DAF IT cybersecurity-related documentation is current and accessible to properly authorized individuals.

6.8.4. Continuously monitors the IT, current threats per intelligence analysis, environment for security-relevant events, assesses proposed configuration changes for potential impact to the cybersecurity posture, and assesses the quality of security controls implementation against performance indicators.

6.8.5. Ensures cybersecurity-related events or configuration changes that impact DAF IT authorization or adversely impact the security posture are formally reported to the AO.

6.8.6. Instrumental in ensuring completion of PM’s responsibilities.

6.9. ISSO

6.9.1. Serves as the primary cybersecurity technical advisor to the ISSM.

6.9.2. Ensures the integration of cybersecurity into and throughout the lifecycle of the IT on behalf of the ISSM.

6.9.3. Instrumental in ensuring completion of PM’s responsibilities.

6.10. ISSE

6.10.1. The ISSE is an individual, group, or organization responsible for conducting information system security engineering activities.

6.10.2. Employs best practices when implementing security controls, including software engineering methodologies, system/security engineering principles, secure design, secure architecture, and secure coding techniques.

6.11. DAF CIO

6.11.1. Accepts High and Very High cybersecurity risks.

6.11.2. Is informed of all DATO decisions.

**7.0** **Tools.** The DoD maintains an RMF Knowledge Service at the following site: <https://rmfks.osd.mil/rmf> with an Air Force Component Workspace under the Collaboration menu containing specific DAF information and templates. Models-Based Systems Engineering and Digital Engineering tools such as Blade Risk Manager and Avionics Systems Susceptibility and Risk Analysis Toolkit, which are nascent applications developed to support risk analysis related to cyber or physical system entry points, vulnerabilities/susceptibilities, threats, mitigations/protections, and information and communications technology supply chain risk management.

**8.0 Training.**

8.1 Group training on A&A is available upon request or during AFLCMC Focus Weeks which are scheduled quarterly throughout the calendar year. Contact SCA or SCAR focal points for training opportunities: <https://acqnow.atrrs.army.mil/Home/Dashboard>.

8.2 The DoD Cyber Exchange NIPR provides access to cyber training and guidance: <https://cyber.mil/>.

8.3 The DISA Security Training, Education, and Professionalization Portal provides access to additional cyber and cyber roles training: <https://www.cdse.edu/stepp/>.

8.4 Air Force Information Technology course SYS 341/342 Cybersecurity Risk Assessment for Weapon System PIT: Aircraft/C2 (<https://www.afit.edu/ls>).

8.5 Cyber workforce development and certification training resources are available at: <https://cwip.cce.af.mil>.

**9.0 Definitions (Also refer to CNSSI 4009).**

**Acquisition Intelligence Analyst (AIA)** serves as a focal point for programs to receive threat support from the intelligence community and to assist a program in the identification and satisfying of intelligence requirements.

**Architecture Analysis Report (AAR)** documents the system’s architecture and cybersecurity concerns. The AAR provides a description of the system being submitted for authorization. The document contains an overview of the system including mission and operating environment. The system description portion shall include architecture drawings and diagrams, description of data flows and types including ports and protocols, external and internal interfaces, hardware and software inventory, and any other system unique characteristics so that the system can be assessed. It may be considered part of the Security Plan.

**Authorizing Official (AO)** is appointed by the DAF CIO as the authority to authorize IT systems as specified in their designation memorandum. The AO has the authority to grant or deny system testing and operation of systems. The AO balances the total risks and the technical, programmatic, and user requirements in rendering authorization decisions.

**Authorizing Official Designated Representative (AODR)** is an individual acting on behalf of an authorizing official in carrying out and coordinating the required activities associated with security authorization.

**Authorization to Operate (ATO)** is a decision issued after the risk assessment process has been completed. In addition to being required for system operations, an ATO is also required by the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center prior to the start of Initial Operational Test and Evaluation and by the Joint Interoperability Test Command prior to interoperability certification testing.

**Continuous Monitoring** is used to monitor authorization operating conditions, and the effectiveness of security controls employed within or inherited by the system and monitoring of any proposed or actual changes to the system and its environment of operation.The program develops a continuous monitoring strategy that must include a plan for annual assessments of a subset of implemented security controls, and the level of independence required of the assessor.

**Denial of Authorization to Operate (DATO)** is a decision issued when cybersecurity risks are determined to be unacceptable when compared to a systems’ mission assurance requirement.

**Interim Authorization to Test (IATT)** is a special type of authorization decision allowing an IT system to operate for the purpose of testing in order to complete specific test objectives. An IATT does not authorize operational use of the system.

**Information System Security Engineer (ISSE)** is the individual assigned responsibility for conducting information system security engineering activities.

**Information System Security Manager (ISSM)** serves as a principal advisor on all matters, technical and otherwise, involving the security of information systems under his/her purview. The ISSM shall be appointed in writing by their respective chain of command/leadership (e.g., Commander, Commanding Officer, PM, CIO, PSO, or corporate equivalent). When circumstances warrant, a single individual may fill both the ISSM and the ISSO roles. ISSM responsibilities should not be assigned as collateral duties.

**Information System Security Officer (ISSO)** is the individual assigned responsibility by the senior agency information security officer, authorizing official, management official, or information system owner for maintaining the appropriate operational security posture for an information system or program.

**Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M)** is a document developed by the program that identifies tasks to mitigate identified risks, issues, or vulnerabilities as directed by the AO. It details resources required to accomplish the elements of the plan, any milestones in meeting the tasks, and scheduled completion dates for the milestones. The format and/or tool used for a POA&M is determined by the AO.

**Platform Information Technology (PIT)** is a special category of information technology which employs computing resources (i.e., hardware, firmware, and optionally software) that are physically embedded in, dedicated to, or essential in real-time to mission performance. PIT is most often associated with a weapon system but is equally applicable to any host Platform including, but not limited to, command and control, armament, training simulators, diagnostic test and maintenance equipment, calibration equipment, equipment used in the research and development of weapons systems, medical technologies, transport vehicles, buildings, and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems.

**Program Manager** **(PM)** is the designated individual with responsibility for and authority to accomplish program objectives for development, production, and sustainment to meet the user's operational needs. The PM shall be accountable for credible cost, schedule, and performance reporting to the Milestone Decision Authority.

**Risk Assessment** is the process of identifying, estimating, and prioritizing risks to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, and reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, resulting from the operation of an information system. As part of risk management, risk assessment incorporates threat and vulnerability analyses, and considers mitigations provided by security controls planned or in place, synonymous with risk analysis.

**Risk Assessment Report (RAR)** contains the results of performing a risk assessment or the formal output from the process of assessing risk.

**Security Assessment Plan** provides the objectives for the security control assessment. The security assessment plan reflects the type of assessment the organization is conducting (e.g., developmental testing and evaluation, independent verification and validation, assessments supporting security authorizations or reauthorizations, audits, continuous monitoring, or assessments after remediation actions).

**Security Assessment Report (SAR)** provides the results of assessing the implementation of the security controls identified in the security plan to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the specified security requirements. The SAR also contains a list of recommended corrective actions for any weaknesses or deficiencies identified in the security controls.

**Security Authorization Package** consists of the following components: Security Plan, SAR, RAR, POA&M, Continuous Monitoring Strategy and the Authorization Decision document. Each AO may add components as necessary.

**Security Control Assessor (SCA)** is appointed by the Air Force CISO to assess IT as specified in their designation memorandum. The SCA makes risk recommendations based on risk assessments to identify residual risks of operating a system. The SCA is responsible for assessing all technical content of products developed as a result of applying risk management framework process to AFLCMC systems and products.

**SCA Representative (SCAR)** may be assigned by the SCA as necessary. SCAR responsibilities are executed as assigned by the SCA within their designation memorandum. SCAR appointments may be granted to an individual or organization.

**Security Controls Traceability Matrix (SCTM)** is matrix documenting the systems agreed upon security requirements derived from all sources, implementation details and schedule, and resources required for assessment. It shows bidirectional traceability between NIST SP 800-53, domain specific overlays and the systems.

**Security Plan (SP)** is a formal document outlining the security requirements for an information system and the controls in place or planned to meet those requirements. It details the system's components, operating environment, implementation of security measures, and connections to other systems. The SP consolidates the agreed-upon security controls, an architecture analysis report, and relevant procedures.

**10.0 References to Law, Policy, Instructions, Guidance, and Publications.**

1. AFI 16-701, Management, Administration, and Oversight of Special Access Programs, 27 Feb 2024
2. AFI 16-1404, Information Protection, 12 April 2023
3. AFI 17-101\_DAFGM 2022-01, Risk Management Framework for Department of The Air Force, Information Technology (IT), 10 June 2022
4. AFLCMC/EZSP/EZSI IP SP AFLCMC Standard Process for Weapon System Program Protection Planning (PPP) & Systems Security Engineering (SSE), 19 April 2019 16 July 2020, VERSION 3.0
5. AFMAN 17-1303, Air Force Cybersecurity Workforce Improvement Program, 12 May 2020
6. CJCSI 6510.01F, Information Assurance (IA) and Support to Computer Network Defense (CND), 9 February 2011, Directive Current as of 9 June 2015
7. CNSSI No. 1253, Categorization and Control Selection for National Security Systems, 29 July 2022
8. CNSSI No. 1254, Risk Management Framework Documentation, Data Element Standards, and Reciprocity Process for National Security Systems, August 2016
9. CNSSI No. 4009, Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Glossary, 6 April 2015
10. DAF Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapons Systems System Security Engineering Cyber Guidebook Version 4.0, 26 July 2021
11. DAFMAN17-1301\_DAFGM2021-02, 12 February 2020, Computer Security
12. Director, OT&E Procedures for Operational Test and Evaluation of Cybersecurity in Acquisition Programs, 3 April 2018
13. DoD Cybersecurity Test and Evaluation Guidebook, 25 April 2018, Version 2.0, Change 1, 10 February 2020
14. DoD Risk, Issue, and Opportunity (RIO) Management Guide for Defense Acquisition Programs, September 2023
15. DoDD 5205.07, Special Access Programs Policy, 4 February 2020
16. DoDD 8140.01, Cyberspace Workforce Management, 5 October 2020
17. DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, 8 June 2022
18. DoDI 5000.89, Test and Evaluation, 19 November 2020
19. DoDI 5000.90, Cybersecurity for Acquisition Decision Authorities and Program Managers, 31 December 2020
20. DoDI 8140.02 Identification, Tracking, and Reporting of Cyberspace Workforce Requirements, 21 December 2021
21. DoDI 8500.01, Cybersecurity, 7 October 2019
22. DoDI 8510.01, Risk Management Framework for DoD Systems, 19 July 2022
23. DoDM 5205.07 - Vol. 1, DoD Special Access Programs Security Manual, 30 September 2020
24. DoDM 8140.03 Cyberspace Workforce Qualification and Management Program, 15 February 2023
25. FISMA, Federal Information Systems Management Act Title III of Public Law 107-347 Sec 301-305, 17 December 2002
26. JSIG Department of Defense Joint Special Access Program Implementation Guide, 11 April 2016, and 5 October 2018 Errata Sheet for the JSIG
27. NIST SP 800-30, Revision 1, Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments, September 2012
28. NIST SP 800-37, Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations, A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy, NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 2, December 2018
29. NIST SP 800-39, Managing Information Security Risk, Organization, Mission, and Information System View, March 2011
30. NIST SP 800-53 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, Revision 4, April 2013 Revision 5, September 2020
31. NIST SP 800-53A. Revision 5. Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Information Systems and Organizations, January 2022
32. NIST SP 800-59, Guideline for Identifying an Information System as a National Security System, August 2003
33. NIST SP 800-160, Systems Security Engineering: Considerations for a Multidisciplinary Approach in the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems, Vol 1, 21 March 2018, Developing Cyber Resilient Systems: A Systems Security Engineering Approach, Vol 2, Revision 1, December 2021
34. SAF/AQ, Cybersecurity Security Classification / Declassification Guide for Air Force Weapon Systems, 17 April 2017

**11.0 Acronym List**

See Attachment 3.

**ATTACHMENT 1**

Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) for Cybersecurity A&A

| **WBS Level** | **WBS** | **Activity** | **Description** | **OPR** | **Input** | **Supplier** | **Output** | **Customer** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 0 | 0 | **Prepare** | Prepare to execute RMF by establishing a context, priorities and requirements for managing risk. Identify an authorization boundary, HW/SW assets, information types and data flows. | PM/SCA/AO | Organizational and system mission objectives, policies, plans, procedures, constraints, priorities, organizational charts, architectural diagrams information types and data flows | PM | Cybersecurity role assignments, allocated requirements, well defined authorization boundary, initial risk assessment, and system description  (AAR, SP) | PM |
| 1 | 1.0 | **Categorize** | Develop and approve IT Categorization and Selection Checklist | PM/SCA/AO | IT Categorization and Selection Checklist | PM | Signed IT Categorization and Selection Checklist | PM |
| 1 | 2.0 | **Select** | Select and document security controls | PM/SCA | AAR, System design artifacts, CONOPS, Program Protection Plan, CSS, specifications, Intel reports (if available), Domain Specific Security Control Overlays | PM | Draft Security Plan tailored and allocated security controls, and Continuous Monitoring Strategy | PM |
| 1 | 3.0 | **Implement** | Implement and document security controls | PM | Security Plan, test results, and verification reports | PM | Updated Security Plan | PM |
| 1 | 4.0 | **Assess** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2 | 4.1 | **System Architecture Analysis** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 | 4.1.1 | **Submit Architecture Analysis artifacts** | Document the system’s architecture, subsystems, authorization boundary, cyber requirements, system baseline (hardware, software, and firmware), interfaces, Ports Protocols and Services (PPS), data types and flows, and threats | PM/ISSM | Design artifacts, DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) views, Configuration Management documents, CONOPS, system/subsystem criticality, system operating environments, classification, system users and access to the system, system components (hardware, software, firmware, networking, ports protocols, and services), data types and flows, system interfaces, and changes/modification from prior architecture analysis | PM | Architecture Analysis Report | SCA |
| 3 | 4.1.2 | **Approve System Architecture Analysis (optional as required by SCA/AO)** | Review the system architecture | SCA/  AO | Architecture Analysis Report | SCA | Approved Architecture Analysis Report | PM |
| 3 | 4.1.3 | **Conduct Cyber threat/mission analysis (optional as required by SCA/AO)** | Review threat/vulnerability/mission analysis data for the purposes of discovering cyber threats, vulnerabilities, risks, and mitigations | PM | Threat information, vulnerability information, system architecture documents, mission description/information | PM | Threat/vulnerability/mission analysis data results (SAR - vulnerabilities, RAR - threats) | SCA/AO |
| 2 | 4.2 | **Security Control Assessment Preparation** | Develop, review, and approve a plan to assess the security controls | PM/ISSM/SCA | AAR, tailored and allocated security controls, program documentation, Overlay(s), Security Plan | PM | Approved Security Assessment Plan (As directed by the AO), Security Requirements Controls Traceability Matrix (SCTM) | SCA/AO |
| 2 | 4.3 | **Security Control Assessment** | Assess the security controls in accordance with the assessment procedures defined in the security assessment plan | PM/SCA | Security Assessment Plan, Security Plan, Test Results/Reports, and supporting artifacts | PM/SCA | Security Assessment Results and Draft Security Assessment Report | SCA |
| 2 | 4.4 | **Document Security Control Assessment Results** | Prepare the security assessment report documenting the issues, findings, and recommendations from the security control assessment | PM/SCA | Security Assessment Plan, Security Plan, Test Results/Reports, Security Assessment Report (draft) | PM | Updated Security Plan, updated draft Continuous Monitoring Strategy and Security Assessment Report | PM/ AO |
| 2 | 4.5 | **Initial Remediation Actions** | Conduct initial remediation actions on security controls based on the findings and recommendations of the security assessment report, reassess remediated control(s), as appropriate, and document results | PM | Findings and recommendations from Approved Security Assessment Report, Test Results/Reports | PM/SCA | Updated Security Assessment Report  (as required by AO) and initial POA&M | PM/AO/SCA |
| 2 | 4.6 | **Risk Assessment Preparation** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 | 4.6.1 | **Identify Purpose** | Identify purpose for risk assessment (initial authorization, re-authorization, in response to incident or system change) | PM/SCA/AO | Security Assessment Report, existing authorization documentation, Incident Reports, system change documentation | PM | Purpose of Risk Assessment (reauthorization, initial, response to incident, etc.) | PM |
| 3 | 4.6.2 | **Identify Scope** | Identify the scope of the risk assessment in terms of organizational applicability, time frame supported, and architectural/technology considerations | PM/SCA | Security Assessment Report, existing authorization documentation, applicable AFIs. | SCA | Scope of the Risk Assessment | PM |
| 3 | 4.6.3 | **Assumptions and Constraints** | Identify the specific assumptions and constraints under which the risk assessment is conducted | PM/SCA | Documented assumptions for: Threat Sources, Threat Events, Vulnerabilities and Predisposing Conditions, Likelihood, Impacts, Risk Tolerance and Uncertainty, Analytic Approach | PM | Documented Assumptions | SCA |
| 3 | 4.6.4 | **Information Sources** | Identify the sources of descriptive, threat, vulnerability, and impact information to be used in the risk assessment | PM/SCA | AAR, Threat and vulnerability information | PM | Documented list of information sources used in risk assessment | SCA |
| 3 | 4.6.5 | **Risk Model and Analytic Approach** | Identify the risk model and analytic approach to be used in the risk assessment | PM/SCA | AO specific guidance | SCA | Documented Risk Model and Analytic Approach | PM |
| 2 | 4.7 | **Conduct Risk Assessment** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 | 4.7.1 | **Identify Threat Sources & Events** | Identify and characterize threat sources of concern, including capability, intent, and targeting characteristics for adversarial threats and range of effects for non-adversarial threats.  Identify potential threat events, relevance of the events, and the threat sources that could initiate the events. | PM/ISSM/SCA | Intel data, AAR, Test report(s), Threat and mission data analysis results, Threat Reports and other intel products | SCA (with PM, Intel, and Office of Special Investigations (OSI) support as required by AO) | Threats Identified in draft Risk Assessment Report | SCA |
| 3 | 4.7.2 | **Identify Vulnerabilities and pre-disposing conditions** | Identify vulnerabilities and predisposing conditions that affect the likelihood that threat events of concern result in adverse impacts | PM/ISSM/SCA | AAR, SAR, Test report(s), Threat and mission data analysis results, Threat Reports, other intel products | SCA (with PM support as required by AO) | Vulnerabilities identified against threat events identified in draft Risk Assessment Report | SCA |
| 3 | 4.7.3 | **Determine Likelihood of Occurrence** | Determine the magnitude of likelihood that threat events of concern result in adverse impacts, considering the characteristics of the threat sources means and opportunities to initiate the events | PM/SCA | AAR, SAR, Test report(s), Threat and mission data analysis results, Threat Reports, other intel products | SCA (with PM support as required by AO) | Likelihood of occurrence for threat events identified in draft Risk Assessment Report | SCA |
| 3 | 4.7.4 | **Determine Impact** | Determine the magnitude of impact based on severity and criticality criteria | PM/SCA | Criticality analysis, mission severity analysis | SCA (with PM support as required by AO) | Magnitude of impact for threat events identified in draft Risk Assessment Report | SCA |
| 3 | 4.7.5 | **Determine Risk** | Quantify the risk to the system/mission from threat events of concern considering: (i) the impact that would result from the events; and (ii) the likelihood of the events occurring. | PM/SCA | Likelihood of occurrence and magnitude of impact for threat events identified in draft Risk Assessment Report | SCA (with PM support as required by AO) | Risk Assessment Report | SCA |
| 3 | 4.7.6 | **Determine DATO need** | If risk is determined to be unacceptable, then the AO, in collaboration with all system stakeholders (e.g. DAF CIO, CISO, MAJCOM, Program Manager), will issue the authorization decision in the form of a DATO. | SCA | Risk Assessment Report | SCA | DATO Recommendation | PM/AO |
| 2 | 4.8 | **Communicate Risk Assessment Results** | Communicate risk assessment results to organizational decision makers to support risk responses and share results | PM/SCA | Risk Assessment Report | PM | Risk Assessment Report Summary | MAJCOM/SCA/AO |
| 1 | 5.0 | **System Authorization** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2 | 5.1 | **Prepare POA&M** | Develop and select mitigation options based on the threat and vulnerability, limit the vulnerability, or stop the threat in turn reducing the likelihood or impact | PM/ISSM/SCA | Program artifacts, Tech Orders and design documents | PM | POA&M | AO |
| 3 | 5.1.1 | **Justification to accept risk(s)** | Justify risk acceptance. If risk remains high or very high - the risk must be coordinated with MAJCOM, the SAE, and accepted by DAF CIO | PM/SCA | Risk Assessment Results | PM | POA&M update | AO/MAJCOM, SAE, and DAF CIO |
| 2 | 5.2 | **Assemble the Authorization Package** | The security authorization package contains: (i) the security plan; (ii) the security assessment and risk assessment reports; and (iii) the POA&M | PM/SCA | Security Plan, RAR, SAR, POA&M, AAR, Continuous Monitoring Plan, draft Authorization Decision, and other relevant artifacts per AO. | PM | Authorization Package | SCA/AO |
| 3 | 5.2.1 | **SCA Risk Recommendation** | SCA documents recommendations based on risks and mitigations; operating conditions will be developed to limit exposure to risks | SCA | Authorization Package | SCA | Coordinated Authorization Package | AO |
| 3 | 5.2.2 | **Program Coordination** | PM coordinate the authorization package with the system stakeholders (as required by AO) | PM or SCAR | Authorization Package | PM | Coordinated Authorization Package | AO |
| 2 | 5.3 | **Risk Authorization Decision** | The AO renders an authorization decision. If high/very high then the DAF CIO accepts the risk | AO or DAF CIO | Coordinated Authorization Package | AO or DAF CIO | Cybersecurity Authorization | PM |
| 3 | 5.3.1 | **Implement Authorization** | SCA/SCAR provides signed authorization (e.g., IATT, ATO, DATO) to the PM. Program distributes the authorization and conditions to the users and testers. | SCA | Signed Authorization | SCA | Cybersecurity Authorization | PM |
| 1 | 6.0 | **Monitor** | PM ensures all system changes are reviewed for cybersecurity impact prior to implementation. The PM must report any Security Incident to the SCA/SCAR. The PM must maintain the system authorization. The PM must initiate an updated risk assessment and authorization prior to the expiration of the current authorization. | PM/SCA/  AO | Reauthorizations, change requests, incidents, Execute Continuous Monitoring Plan, etc. | PM | Authorizations, updated RAR, etc. (depends on the results of the monitoring) | PM |

**ATTACHMENT 2**

**Cybersecurity Risk Assessment and Management**

**1.0 Purpose.** Cybersecurity risk assessment is the part of risk management that incorporates threat and vulnerability analyses, and considers mitigations provided by security controls planned or in place. Cybersecurity risk is a function of the likelihood of a given threat exploiting a potential vulnerability and the resulting impact. There are three components of cybersecurity risk:

* A future root cause (manifested by a specific threat and vulnerability), which, if eliminated or corrected, would prevent a potential event from occurring
* A likelihood assessed at the present time of that future root cause occurring
* The impact of that future occurrence

A threat is any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through an information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service. A vulnerability is a weakness in a system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited by a threat source. A threat does not present a risk to a system when there is no vulnerability that can be exploited and conversely, vulnerability does not present a risk if there is no threat. There may be many threats associated with a single vulnerability and many vulnerabilities associated with a single threat.

In particular, this document provides a risk assessment methodology for planning, identifying, analyzing, handling, and monitoring cybersecurity risks which agree with the suggested six-step management process defined in the *Department of Defense Risk, Issue and Opportunity (RIO) Management Guide for Defense Acquisition Programs*, September 2023. Specific tasks for Cybersecurity Risk Assessments are provided in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-30, Revision 1, *Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments.* NIST SP 800-37 Revision 2, *Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations: A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy*, Appendix E – Summary of RMF Tasks describes the tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles required to apply the RMF to systems. Many of these tasks are relevant to this cybersecurity risk assessment methodology. NIST SP 800-39, *Managing Information Security Risk*, may also be consulted for guidance on an integrated program for managing information security risk to operations to complement an overall risk management program.

**2.0 Risk Planning (WBS 4.6). (Reference NIST SP 800-30 Tasks 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, and 1-5).** Since the DoD RIO Guidedoes not attempt to address specialized risks, such as cybersecurity, programs should utilize this guidance to map cybersecurity risks into their overall risk management processes. The purpose, scope, assumptions, and constraints of the risk assessment should be identified. For assessing cybersecurity risks, it is recommended that the program form a specialized cybersecurity risk assessment team. The purpose of this team is to bring system stakeholders together to provide a forum for continually identifying and assessing cybersecurity risk throughout system design and operation. This team will recommend solutions to the PM and should include all the necessary stakeholders, internal and external. Each program can choose its own team members, but the team should include program engineering, system security engineering, information protection, program protection, intelligence representatives, using MAJCOM, test organizations, the SCA or SCAR, ISSM, and ISSO.

**3.0 Risk Identification (WBS 4.7). (Reference NIST SP 800-30 Task 1-5)**. The objective of risk identification is to produce a list of cybersecurity risks that can be prioritized by risk level and used to inform risk response decisions. It includes the identification of cybersecurity threats against the system and the identification of cybersecurity vulnerabilities within the system.

**3.1 Threat Identification (WBS 4.7.1). (Reference NIST SP 800-30 Tasks 2-1 and 2-2).** The cybersecurity threats to the system and its operational environment must be understood. Threats can be categorized as internal or external. Internal threats are the result of individuals with malicious intent or just erroneous actions in operating the system. External threats are the result of outside sources trying to disrupt DoD operations. The external threat is generally an orchestrated attempt by a foreign government. Threat sources may also be adversarial or non-adversarial. The result of this action should be clear and concise threat statements that capture circumstances or events with the potential to intentionally or unintentionally cause an incident affecting the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of a system. This may be achieved by attack path analysis modeling, review of threat assessments, and review of intelligence reports.

**3.2 Vulnerability Identification and Analysis (WBS 4.7.2). (Reference NIST SP 800-30 Task 2-3; NIST SP 800-37 Task A-3).** A cybersecurity vulnerability refers to the inability of the system to withstand the effects of a hostile environment open to attack or damage. A flaw or weakness exists in the system that an attacker can access and exploit. Non-compliant security controls may be used as a basis to identify system vulnerabilities as well as results from cybersecurity penetration testing, attack path analysis, and any cybersecurity relevant results from the Test & Evaluation Community.

The system should be assessed against each requirement or control to determine its level of compliance. If non-compliant, this security weakness should be further evaluated to determine if it represents a system vulnerability. If a threat statement cannot be linked to at least one vulnerability, a root cause does not exist, and the threat should be removed from further consideration. Similarly, if a threat-vulnerability relationship cannot be established for each non-compliant requirement, then the non-compliant requirement does not pose a risk to the system and should be removed from further evaluation.

The results of these actions are clear and concise vulnerability statements describing a flaw or weakness in design or implementation, including security procedures and controls, and the linkage of each vulnerability to at least one threat.

**3.3 Write Risk Statements (WBS 4.7.5).** Capturing a statement of risk involves considering and recording the conditions that are causing concern for a potential loss to the system. Risk statements are ideally neutral, clear, and quantifiable. The objective of capturing a statement of risk is to arrive at a concise description of risk, which can be understood and acted upon. The components and description of a statement of risk are:

* Possible Risk Event: a single phrase or sentence that briefly describes the key circumstances, situations, etc., causing concern, doubt, anxiety, or uncertainty
* Impact or Consequence: a single phrase or sentence that describes the key, possible negative outcome(s) of the current conditions

Risk statements must be linked to specific threats and vulnerabilities and documented in the Risk Assessment Report (RAR). The combination of a specific threat and vulnerability may result in one or many risk statements. The result of this action will be a number of unique risk statements, each specifically mapped to a threat and vulnerability pairing. Risk statements should also be associated with their cybersecurity control/requirement identified in the SAR. The combination of a threat and vulnerability often results in information that is classified, and the program’s security classification guide should be consulted for correct classification of risk information. The SAF/AQ Cybersecurity Security Classification / Declassification Guide for Air Force Weapon Systems, 17 April 2017, should also be consulted for additional instructions to classify DAF Weapon Systems cybersecurity information.

As a result of the actions under *Risk Identification*, the Risk team should have generated a list of system specific threats, identified system vulnerabilities linked to specific threats, and developed corresponding risk statements that are documented in the RAR. The “if–then” format presents the possible risk event or condition (“if”) and the potential outcome or consequence(s) (“then”). If some event or condition occurs, then a specific negative impact or consequence to program objectives will result. For additional information on the elements, how to format and write a risk statement, please see “How to write a good risk statement.” [https://www.dau.edu/sites/default/files/Migrate/DATLFiles/Nov-Dec\_2017/Thompson\_Stump.pdf](https://www.dau.edu/sites/default/files/Migrate/DATLFiles/Nov-Dec_2017/Thompson_Stump.pdf?Web=1)

**4.0 Risk Analysis.** Risk analysis involves determining and assigning a likelihood of occurrence and impact to each of the identified risks from the risk identification activity. The following subsections provide an exemplary model for risk analysis. Other models may be approved by the AO.

**4.1 Calculate Likelihood (WBS 4.7.3). (Reference NIST SP 800-30 Task 2-4).** Assign a likelihood of occurrence based on a relative scale, taking into account an estimation of the means and opportunity of a potential adversary.

**4.1.1 Means.** Means represents an estimation of an adversary’s capability in creating the conditions necessary for a risk occurrence, considering cost, time, and skill needed to execute a successful attack.Threat is very similar to adversary, but a threat is the specific source of harm, for example a known hacker, a specific employee, whereas the adversary is the collection or group of threats, for example a hacker collective or nation state. Threats arise from human actions and natural events. An attack is an action intended to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability of a system. There are many types of attacks including intrusions, reconnaissance, tampering, implantation, denial of service, corruption of data, ex-filtration of data, etc. Each risk is assessed for Means and assigned a Means level according to the criteria in Table 1.

**Table 1. Means**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Level** | **Description** |
| M-5 | Threat has a very high capability of success to exploit the vulnerability. If the threat event is initiated or occurs, it is almost certain to succeed. |
| M-4 | Threat has a high capability of success to exploit the vulnerability. If the threat event is initiated or occurs, it is highly likely to succeed. |
| M-3 | Threat has a moderate capability of successto exploit the vulnerability. If the threat event is initiated or occurs, it is likely to succeed. |
| M-2 | Threat has a low capability of successto exploit the vulnerability. If the threat event is initiated or occurs, it is a low likelihood to succeed. |
| M-1 | Threat has a very low capability of success to exploit the vulnerability. If the threat event is initiated or occurs, it is a very low likelihood to succeed. |

**4.1.2 Opportunity.** Opportunity represents an estimation of an adversary’s likelihood to attack the system. A system’s attack surface is the set of methods and interfaces through which an adversary can enter the system and conduct an attack. Each risk is assessed an Opportunity level according to the criteria in Table 2.

**Table 2. Opportunity**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Value** | **Description** |
| O-5 | Adversary is almost certain to initiate the threat event. The threat event/actor or Tactic, Technique or Procedure (TTP) has been seen by the system or mission area. |
| O-4 | Adversary is highly likelyto initiate the threat event. The threat event/actor or TTP has been seen by the organization’s peers. |
| O-3 | Adversary is somewhat likelyto initiate the threat event. The threat event/actor or TTP has been reported by a trusted source. |
| O-2 | Adversary is unlikely to initiate the threat event. The threat event/actor or TTP has been predicted by a trusted source. |
| O-1 | Adversary is highly unlikelyto initiate the threat event. The threat event/actor or TTP has been described by a somewhat credible source. |

**4.1.3 Likelihood.** With the aid of the Likelihood Matrix (Figure 1), individual means and opportunity levels are used to determine an overall Likelihood level for each risk.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Likelihood** | | | | | | |
| **Threat Opportunity** | **O-5** | **L-2** | **L-3** | **L-4** | **L-5** | **L-5** |
| **O-4** | **L-2** | **L-3** | **L-4** | **L-5** | **L-5** |
| **O-3** | **L-1** | **L-2** | **L-3** | **L-4** | **L-5** |
| **O-2** | **L-1** | **L-2** | **L-3** | **L-4** | **L-4** |
| **O-1** | **L-1** | **L-1** | **L-2** | **L-3** | **L-3** |
|  | **M-1** | **M-2** | **M-3** | **M-4** | **M-5** |
|  | **Threat Means** | | | | |

**Figure 1. Likelihood Matrix**

**4.2 Calculate Impact (WBS 4.7.4). (Reference NIST SP 800-30 Task 2-5).** Assign an impact of occurrence based on a relative scale, taking into account an estimation of the criticality of the system and the severity of system damage.

**4.2.1 Criticality.** Criticality represents an estimation of adverse effects to the mission, organization, assets, individuals, or nation due to system/capability/information loss or compromise. Each risk is assessed for Criticality and assigned a Criticality level according to the criteria in Table 3.

**Table 3. Criticality**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Level** | **Description** |
| C-5 | Loss of the system/subsystem/function/capability results in Severe or total mission failure and/or compromise or loss of information results in exceptionally grave damage to national security. |
| C-4 | Loss of the system/subsystem/function/capability results in significant/unacceptable mission degradation and/or compromise or loss of information results in grave damage to national security. |
| C-3 | Loss of the system/subsystem/function/capability results in moderate or partial mission degradation and/or compromise or loss of information results in damage to national security. |
| C-2 | Loss of the system/subsystem/function/capability results in minor mission degradation and/or compromise or loss of information results in limited damage to national security. |
| C-1 | Loss of the system/subsystem/function/capability results in minimal mission degradation and/or compromise or loss of information results in negligible damage to national security. |

**4.2.2 Severity.** Severity represents an estimation of the damage to the system resulting from exploitation of a vulnerability by an adversary, stated in terms of loss of capability, disruptive system changes or loss of information. Each risk is assessed for severity and assigned a *Vulnerability* *Severity* level according to the criteria in Table 4.

**Table 4. Severity**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Level** | **Description** |
| S-5 | The vulnerability is of severe/catastrophic concern. Vulnerability exploitation results in severe/catastrophic system performance impact, and/or severe compromise or modification of the system information. |
| S-4 | The vulnerability is of significant concern. Vulnerability exploitation causes significant unacceptable system capability impact and/or significant compromise or modification of the system/system information. |
| S-3 | The vulnerability is of moderate concern. Vulnerability exploitation causes partial system performance impact and/or partial compromise or modification of the system/system information. |
| S-2 | The vulnerability is of minor concern. Vulnerability exploitation causes minor system capability impact and/or minor compromise or modification of the system/system information. |
| S-1 | The vulnerability is of minimal concern. Vulnerability exploitation causes minimal system performance impact and/or no compromise or modification of the system/system information. |

**4.2.3 Impact.** With the aid of the Impact Risk Factor Matrix (Figure 2), individual Severity and Criticality levels are used to determine an overall Impact Risk Factor Level for each risk.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Impact** | | | | | | |
| **Vulnerability Severity** | **S-5** | **I-2** | **I-3** | **I-4** | **I-5** | **I-5** |
| **S-4** | **I-2** | **I-3** | **I-3** | **I-4** | **I-5** |
| **S-3** | **I-1** | **I-2** | **I-3** | **I-4** | **I-5** |
| **S-2** | **I-1** | **I-1** | **I-2** | **I-3** | **I-4** |
| **S-1** | **I-1** | **I-1** | **I-1** | **I-2** | **I-3** |
|  | **C-1** | **C-2** | **C-3** | **C-4** | **C-5** |
|  | **Mission Criticality** | | | | |

**Figure 2. Impact Risk Factor Matrix**

**4.3 Determine Risk (WBS 4.7.5). (Reference NIST SP 800-30 Task 2-6).** The Likelihood and Impact levels are used to determine an Overall Risk Factor for each risk using the Overall Risk Factor Matrix (Figure 3).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Likelihood** | L-5 | Very Low | Low | Moderate | High | Very High |
| L-4 | Very Low | Low | Moderate | High | Very High |
| L-3 | Very Low | Low | Moderate | Moderate | High |
| L-2 | Very Low | Low | Low | Low | Moderate |
| L-1 | Very Low | Very Low | Very Low | Low | Low |
|  | I-1 | I-2 | I-3 | I-4 | I-5 |
| **Impact** | | | | | | |

**Figure 3. Overall Risk Factor Matrix**

**4.4 Communicate Results (WBS 4.8). (Reference NIST SP 800-30 Tasks 3-1 and 3-2; NIST SP 800-37 Tasks R-2 and R-5).** The results of the risk analysis are captured in a RAR. The RAR should include the complete risk analysis results including specific justification of all risk assessment values and the analysis that led to their selection.

As a result of the actions under *Risk Analysis*, the risk team has completed a comprehensive risk analysis taking into account the Means and Opportunity of an adversary to attack the system as well as the Criticality and Severity of such an attack. An overall Risk Factor has been generated for each individual risk.

**5.0 Handling. (Reference NIST SP 800-37 Tasks A-6 and R-3).** Once risks have been identified and quantified, the question of what to do about the risk must be answered. This is accomplished by identifying, evaluating, and selecting management strategies to set risk at an acceptable level. Results are documented in the RAR and should include the specifics of what should be done, when it should be accomplished, and who is responsible, and required resources to implement. Risk management strategies that require future implementation should be documented in a POA&M. For each risk, one or more of the following management strategies may apply:

**a. Eliminating Risk:** This involves completely removing a threat and/or its impact, which is the safest approach. It could mean not performing a risky activity or changing program requirements to avoid the risk altogether. While eliminating risk provides the highest level of safety, it might also mean missing out on potential benefits that come with taking some risks.

**b. Avoiding Risk:** This strategy involves avoiding actions that carry risk by modifying program cybersecurity requirements, such as adjusting funding, schedules, or technical specs. However, avoiding risk entirely might mean losing out on opportunities for greater capability.

**c. Controlling or Reducing Risk:** Also known as risk mitigation, this involves making changes to the system’s design, implementing additional procedures, or increasing user training to reduce vulnerability. This approach lessens the severity or likelihood of risks.

**d. Transferring Risk:** This means shifting the responsibility and accountability for managing the risk to another party. The details of this transfer must be clearly documented in the Security Plan.

**e. Accepting Risk:** Sometimes, the level of risk is deemed acceptable. This decision must be documented in an Authorization Decision Memorandum before the system can begin testing or operations. Only authorized officials can accept risks, with high and very high risk accepted by DAF CIO.

**6.0 Monitor (WBS 6.0). (Reference NIST SP 800-30 Tasks 4-1 and 4-2; NIST SP 800-37 Tasks M-1, M-2, M-3, M-4, M-5 and M-6).** The intent of risk monitoring is to ensure continued risk management throughout the system’s operational life. The need to monitor and maintain risk assessment results over time overlaps with the continuous monitoring step in the RMF and should be documented in a continuous monitoring plan. The plan should cover change management, incident reporting, updated threat and/or vulnerability assessments, POA&M updates, and updated risk assessments supporting cybersecurity authorizations.

**Attachment 3**

**Acronym List**

AAR Architecture Analysis Report

AFI Air Force Instruction

AIA Acquisition Intelligence Analyst

A&A Assessment and Authorization

AFLCMC Air Force Life Cycle Management Center

AO Authorizing Official

AODR Authorizing Official Designated Representative

ATO Authorization to Operate

C2 Command and Control

CIO Chief Information Officer

CISO Chief Information Security Officer

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

CND Computer Network Defense

CNSSI Committee on National Security Systems Instruction

CONOPS Concept of Operations

CSS Cybersecurity Strategy

DAF Department of the Air Force

DATO Denial of Authorization to Operate

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DoD Department of Defense

DoDAF DoD Architecture Framework

DoDI Department of Defense Instruction

FISMA Federal Information Systems Management Act

FY Fiscal Year

IA Information Assurance

IATT Interim Authorization to Test

IS Information Systems

ISO Information System Owner

ISSE Information System Security Engineering

ISSM Information System Security Manager

ISSO Information Systems Security Officer

IT Information Technology

JSIG Joint Special Access Program (SAP) Implementation Guide

MAJCOM Major Command

NIPRNet Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

OSI Office of Special Investigations

OT&E Operational Test and Evaluation

PIT Platform Information Technology

PM Program Manager

POA&M Plan of Action & Milestones

POC Point of Contact

PPP Program Protection Plan

RAR Risk Assessment Report

RCA Rapid Cyber Acquisition

RIO Risk, Issue and Opportunity

RFP Request for Proposal

RMF Risk Management Framework

SAE Service Acquisition Executive

SAO Subordinate Authorizing Official

SAP Special Access Program

SAR Security Assessment Report

SCA Security Control Assessor

SCAR Security Control Assessor Representative

SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information

SCTM Security Controls Traceability Matrix

SIPOC Suppliers, Inputs, Process, Outputs, Customers

SP Standard Process

SP Security Plan

SSE System Security Engineering

S&P Standards and Process

WBS Work Breakdown Structure